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Howard v. Allstate Insurance Co.-Louisiana's Attempt at
Comparative Causation

INTRODUCTION

Recently, in Howard v. Allstate Insurance Co.,' the Louisiana Supreme Court had the opportunity to decide whether Louisiana courts
should apply comparative fault principles found in Louisiana Civil Code
article 2323 to animal cases that arise under Louisiana Civil Code article
2321. This note will explore the important aspects of the decision in
that case, placing particular emphasis on the Howard court's introduction
of the concept of comparative causation.
This casenote is organized into two sections. The first section contains an analysis of all issues raised in the Howard case and examines
the court's handling of those issues. One particular issue-comparative
causation-is the focus of the second section, which explores that issue
with particular thoroughness.
ANALYSIs OF THE HOWARD CASE

Facts and Disposition by the Courts
The Howard case arose when eleven-year-old Tina Holloway was
attacked by a neighbor's dog. Tina had been playing with her neighbor
Christi Barcelona near the Barcelona yard, when Christi invited the
children to play on her backyard swing set. Two areas comprised the
Barcelona's backyard, a small first yard, which adjoined the home, and
a larger second yard, which contained the swing set. The dog lived in
the second yard, in the area beyond two gates, and a "Beware of Dog"
sign greeted visitors to the first gate. As a result of the dog's attack,
Tina sustained fairly severe injures.'

Copyright 1989, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.

1. 520 So. 2d 715 (La. 1988).
2. The various children's testimony conflicted as to whether Christi told the children
to wait before entering the second yard. "Whatever the instruction given Tina, she preceded
the younger children into the yard where she was immediately attacked by [the dog],
whom she had not seen before he attacked her." Id. at 717.
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The jury found the Barcelonas liable under Louisiana Civil Code
4
article 2321,1 but reduced Tina's recovery in proportion to her "fault."
The trial judge, however, refused to allow the reduction and gave Tina
full recovery. The case was appealed, and the court of appeal reversed
the trial judge, reinstating the jury's findings.' Both Parties then appealed
to the Louisiana Supreme Court.
The Louisiana Supreme Court addressed four issues. The first issue
the court considered was whether the Barcelonas could be liable under
Louisiana Civil Code article 2321 without proof of negligence. The court
found that the article created liability without proof of negligence based
solely on the ownership of the animal.6 Hence, the Barcelonas were
liable as owners even though no negligence had been proven.
The court next considered the second issue, whether the court had
the discretion to apply article 2323, the comparative fault statute, to
this situation. The supreme court found that since the legislature had
not specified the range of situations covered by the comparative fault
of article 2323, the judiciary had the authority to designate situations
in which it applied.7
After determining that it had the discretion to apply article 2323 to
this case, the court focused on the prior jurisprudence to resolve the
third issue: the applicability of article 2323 to animal cases. The supreme
court looked to two previous cases that applied the comparative fault
article to strict liability cases, Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast' and Landry v.
State.9 Based on Bell and Landry, the court held that comparative fault
principles could also be applied to animal cases arising under article
2321.10
The final issue addressed by the court, and the most important,
was whether the conceptual difficulty in comparing strict liability and
negligence prevented reduction in damages. In Howard, the defendant
sought to introduce the plaintiff's negligence in order to reduce the

3. Id. La. Civ. Code art. 2321 states:
The owner of an animal is answerable for the damage he has caused; but if
the animal had been lost, or had strayed more than a day, he may discharge
himself from this responsibility, by abandoning him to the person who has
sustained the injury; except where the master has turned loose a dangerous or
noxious animal, for then he must pay for all the harm done, without being
allowed to make the abandonment.
4. 520 So. 2d at 718.
5. Id.
6. Id.at 717.
7. Id.at 718.
8. 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985). Bell was heard by the Supreme Court on a certified
question from the Fifth Circuit.
9. 495 So. 2d 1284 (La. 1986).
10. 520 So. 2d at 718-19.
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damage award. The defendant's liability, however, was strict liability.

Faced with the prospect of comparing the plaintiff's negligence to the
defendant's strict liability, the court introduced the concept of "comparative causation" to resolve the question of reduction. In the court's
view, this comparative causation principle avoided this conceptual conflict
between negligence and strict liability." However, this comparative cau-

sation concept, which will be discussed later in greater length, does not
solve the conceptual problems of the court, and in fact creates new

problems.
Analysis of the Howard Opinion
The Louisiana Supreme Court began its analysis of the case by
reviewing the liability of an owner under article 2321. The court found
the Barcelonas liable without proof of negligence under this article
because they owned the dog. The court, by simply assuming the case

involved strict liability, overlooked the fact that the case may have been

2
properly classified as an absolute liability case.'

Animal cases in the past have been classified not only as strict
liability cases, but also as absolute liability cases. 3 The confusion stems
from the history of the liability for animals. At common law, owners
were absolutely liable for the damages caused by their animals because

the animal presented an unreasonable risk of harm. 14 Regardless of the
precautions taken by the owner, he could not be relieved of his liability.

In Louisiana, article 2321 creates liability for animals. The Louisiana
Supreme Court has defined this article as encompassing both "strict
liability" and "absolute liability."'" Hence, it is unknown which term
correctly describes liability for animals in Louisiana.

11. Id.at 719.
12. The court states in Howard that it is "review[ing] the court of appeal's holding
that comparative fault should apply to this strict liability case.. " The court thus
unequivocably assumes that this case arose in a strict liabilty rather than absolute liability
context.
13. Rozell v. Louisiana Animal Breeders Coop., 434 So. 2d 404 (La. 1983); Briley
v. Mitchell, 238 La. 551, 115 So. 2d 851 (1959); Vrendenburg v. Behan, 33 La. Ann.
627 (1881).
14. At common law, the defendant must pay damages although he neither intentionally
injured the plaintiff nor failed to live up to the objective standard of reasonableness that
is at the root of negligence. This liability has been termed both strict liability and absolute
liability at common law. It is referred to in the text as absolute liability to distinguish
it from the strict liability that is imposed in Louisiana only in statutorily mandated
situations. For a discussion of the development of liability for animals in common law
states, see W. Prosser, J. Wade & V. Schwartz, Torts 705-09 (7th ed. 1982).
15. Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113 (La. 1974), held that the fault of the master,
when his domesticated animal harms another, is in the nature of strict liability. Id. at
117. In contrast, the supreme court in Rozell v. Louisiana Animal Breeders Coop., 434
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The classification as strict or absolute liability carries significant
practical consequences. One consequence is that there are limited defenses
to strict liability,' 6 whereas there are no defenses under absolute liability.
Since the applicability of comparative fault presented the most important
issue of the case, the classification as absolute or strict liability was
essential to the decision of the case. If Howard had been decided under
an absolute liability theory, the defendant could not have raised the
plaintiff's fault at all. Nonetheless, the court simply termed the liability
"strict" without any discussion of the question, allowing the defendant
7
to assert his defense.
The distinction between strict and absolute liability in animal cases
is a sufficiently important one that the supreme court should not have
ignored it. By allowing the defense of comparative fault to be asserted
against the plaintiff, however, the court impliedly resolved the question
in favor of strict liability. Yet the question remains open since the court
devoted no discussion to this crucial issue.
The supreme court next turned its attention to the second issue: the
discretion of the court in applying article 2323. The supreme court
resolved the issue in favor of discretion, reasoning that since the article
does not designate the cases in which the courts "can or cannot allow
a defense of contributory negligence," the judiciary has the authority
to decide when the article does apply. 8 In so resolving the issue, the
court failed to recognize that the article itself may have implicit limitations.
Article 2323 clearly states, "[wjhen contributory negligence is applicable" comparative fault principles may be applied. Contributory
negligence, a defense in Louisiana prior to 1980, applied in negligence
cases to reduce a plaintiff's recovery from a negligent defendant. However, contributory negligence was not a defense in strict liability cases
when the legislature adopted the comparative fault regime of article
2323. The fact that the legislature limited comparative fault principles
to cases in which contributory negligence would have been applicable
is strong evidence that the legislature did not envision the application

So. 2d 404 (La. 1983), found that liability was imposed under article 2321 on the basis
of ownership alone. This seems akin to absolute liability, and has been placed in absolute
liability sections in torts textbooks. See Maraist, Tort Supplement (1986).
16. In the past there were three defenses to strict liability-victim fault, fault of a
third person, and irresistible force-as articulated in Rozell v. Louisiana Animal Breeders
Coop., 496 So. 2d 275, 279 (La. 1986). The doctrines of assumption of the risk and
contributory negligence also barred the plaintiff's recovery prior to Rozell. Now, arguably,
comparative causation has replaced these defenses. Assumption of the risk was abrogated
as a defense recently in Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1988). The
defenses of irresistible force and third party fault remain untested.
17. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
18. 520 So. 2d at 719.
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of comparative fault principles to strict liability cases. Under this interpretation, article 2323 should apply only when the plaintiff based his
claim on the defendant's negligence. The supreme court, however, inferred broad judicial discretion from the fact that the legislature did
not specify the cases to which article 2323 applied. The court ignored
the argument that the article did limit itself to cases in which contributory
negligence had previously applied.
The third issue before the court involved determining the applicability
of comparative fault in cases arising under article 2321. Previous animal
cases had recognized and applied available defenses,' 9 but none had used
comparative fault. Since the adoption of article 2323, the court has not
had an opportunity to apply article 2323 to an animal case. 20 Therefore,
the Howard court looked at the issue for the first time. The court
formulated a blanket rule: comparative fault applies to all animal liability
cases arising under article 2321 .21
The court's analysis of the issue is not persuasive. The holding was
based on two earlier cases, Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast22 and Landry v.
State,23 in which the supreme court applied comparative fault to other
theories of liability. The Howard court, however, rested its holding on
a loose analogy to those cases and failed to follow the reasoning of
either case. The first case, Bell, involved the question whether comparative fault principles apply to strict products liability cases. In his
plurality opinion, Justice Dennis applied comparative fault, but outlined
the limitations on the application of comparative fault in a strict products
liability case. Justice Dennis found that article 2323 governed strict
products liability cases only when a reduction in the plaintiff's recovery
would serve to increase his awareness in using the product, and would
24
not decrease the manufacturer's incentive to produce a safe product.
Had the Howard court followed the reasoning of Bell rather than relying
on the fact that the situation was roughly similar-in both cases a
strictly liable defendant sought reduction for the plaintiff's negligence-

19. The available defenses were (1) fault of the victim, (2) fault of a third person,
and (3) irresistible force.
20. Prior to the adoption of the revised comparative fault provision, article 2323,
the court declined to apply comparative fault principles in any case, relying on the defense
of contributory negligence. Since the adoption of article 2323, effective in 1980, the court
has not had an opportunity to apply article 2323 to an animal case. The facts in Rozell,
434 So. 2d 404, occurred before the adoption of that article.
21. 520 So. 2d at 718-19.
22. 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985).
23. 495 So. 2d 7284 (La. 1986).
24. Bell, 462 So. 2d at 170. "Where the threat of a reduction in recovery will provide
consumers with an incentive to use a product carefully, without exacting an inordinate
sacrifice of other interests, comparative principles would be applied for the sake of accident
prevention." Id.
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the court would have balanced the effect of reduction of recovery on
the plaintiff's and defendant's behavior. Arguably, if the Bell test had
been used, article 2323 would not have been applied to reduce Tina's
recovery. Tina was an eleven year old with a diminished mental capacity,
and a reduction would not serve to make her more aware of the danger.
The second case relied on by the Howard court, Landry v. State,21
addressed the application of comparative fault to the article 2317 strict
26
liability of a custodian for damage caused by things in his custody.
The court in Landry held the state strictly liable for injuries sustained
when Landry slipped because of the erosion of a seawall upon which
he was walking. The supreme court, however, allowed reduction of
Landry's recovery because of his negligence-he was carrying fish nets
27
and a hamper in front of him and could not see where he was walking.
The court added a qualification, however, noting that "[a] reduction
in plaintiff's recovery [would] not diminish the defendant-owner's incentive to remove unreasonable risks from his property," 28 while the
reduction would give similarly situated plaintiffs a motivation for exercising reasonable care in the circumstances.2 9 On the Howard facts it
would be almost impossible to argue that a reduction in the recovery
of an eleven-year-old girl with diminished mental capacity would serve
to increase awareness in other similarly situated plaintiffs. In sum, neither
Bell nor Landry, therefore, stands for the proposition for which they
are cited-that comparative fault principles should apply to all animal
liability cases arising under article 2321.
The final issue before the supreme court was whether the theoretical
inconsistency between negligence and strict liability prevented the application of article 2323 to reduce recovery. The court attempted to
resolve this inconsistency by introducing a new concept in Louisiana,
comparative causation. In adopting comparative causation, the court
relied upon an earlier case, Watson v. State Farm Insurance Co. 30 and
that opinion's reliance on the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. The
Howard court's reliance on Watson is unjustified for two reasons.
First, the court in Howard overlooked the apparent conflicts between
its reasoning and language in the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, the

25. 495 So. 2d 1284.
26. Article 2317 contemplates liability for things or people in the custody of a
caretaker. It is thought to be an introductory article that is modified by the subsequent,
more specific articles that follow. As article 2321, a subsequent article, is more specific
in its focus of liability, the liability under article 2321 should prime the liability that
would attach under article 2317. The specific should include the general, and in this case,
the specific is article 2321 and the general is article 2317.
27. Landry, 495 So. 2d at 1290.
28. Id. at 1290-91.
29. Id.
30. 469 So. 2d 967 (La. 1985).
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basis of the Watson decision. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act
provides in part that "[i]n determining the percentages of fault, the
trier of fact shall consider both the nature of the conduct of each party
at fault and the extent of the causal relation between the conduct and
the damages claimed." 3 The Act uses "nature of the conduct" to
indicate that the blameworthiness of the parties will be evaluated in
apportioning the damages among the parties. The Howard court, however, seeks to ignore the plaintiff's blameworthiness, as this is part of
the conceptual conflict. Thus, reliance on the Act is patently inconsistent
with the supreme court's reasoning. The supreme court concluded that
damages should be
"the extent to which each party contributed to' 3the
2
apportioned.
is
loss
the
which
by
the measure
The court overlooked a second inconsistency in using Watson, and
hence the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, to support its position. The
Act uses the terms "fault" and "cause" in the same sentence, both
describing aspects of the method of apportioning damages under the
Act. "Fault" is used as a criteria for determining whose conduct will
be considered, while "cause" is used to assess the damages arising from
the conduct considered. Thus, the terms are interdependent, and the
method for apportioning damages would fail without determining "fault"
and "cause."
The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, sought to use only "cause"
in apportioning damages. The court relied on the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act as a means of apportioning damages based on "cause." That
reliance though, is erroneous, as the court failed to adopt "fault" as
the other criteria under the Act. The court simply adopted the segment
of the Act that is favorable to its reasoning and ignored the rest. This
action by the court is a misuse of the "cause" language, as it does not
show the interdependence of "fault" and "cause" under the Act. Thus,
reliance on the Uniform Comparative Fault Act for apportionment of
damages based on cause is misplaced.
In sum, the supreme court should not have relied on Watson without
delving into the policies behind the opinion in that case. Cursory analysis
of Watson reveals fundamental inconsistencies between that court's reasoning and the Howard court's conclusions.
COMPARATIVE CAUSATION

Conceptual Problems with Comparative Causation
The court in Howard used comparative causation to resolve the
conceptual conflict that arose when comparative fault principles were

31. Howard, 520 So. 2d at 719 (quoting the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, § 2(b)
(emphasis added)).
32. Id. at 719.
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applied to strict liability cases and to prevent the reintroduction of
negligence in a strict liability action.33 Under a strict liability theory,
the defendant is liable for damages regardless of any blameworthiness
or culpability. In fact, proof of blameworthy conduct is not allowed,
so the court does not know whether the defendant is culpable.3 4 Negligence, on the other hand, requires a showing of blameworthiness or
culpability. In Howard, the defendant sought to introduce evidence of
the plaintiff's blameworthy conduct." Hence, article 2323, which uses
the term "fault" led to a comparison of two unlike things: culpable
conduct (the negligence of the plaintiff) and conduct not known to be
culpable (the basis for the defendant's strict liability).
The court's analytical distinction between the culpability on the
plaintiff's behalf and no known culpability on the defendant's behalf
is correct. The court's solution, the introduction of the concept of
comparative causation, is not really helpful. First of all, the implementation of comparative causation does not eliminate the conceptual conflict. Second, the plaintiff will be allowed to benefit from his own
mistake if his recovery cannot be reduced.
Despite the court's expectations, comparative causation does not
eliminate the conceptual conflict between the application of comparative
fault principles to negligent plaintiffs and strictly liable defendants. The
court believed that comparative causation would allow the trier of fact
to compare the causal conduct of the parties without reference to the
"fault," negligent or nonnegligent, of the parties. The factfinder could
then allocate the plaintiff's recovery according to the respective causal
contribution of each party.
The problem with this approach is that fault must still be considered.
To invoke the principles of comparative causation, the defendant must
initially show that the plaintiff was guilty of some fault. If the defendant

33. There are actually two problems that the court attempted to resolve: a conceptual
problem and a practical problem. The conceptual difficulty involves comparing strict
liability and negligence. The two types of legal fault are distinct, and attempting to
compare them is akin to comparing apples and oranges. The court, however, glosses over
this conceptual problem and focuses on the practical difficulty.
This practical difficulty arises because the court did not wish to allow the introduction
of the plaintiff's negligence in a strict liability action. The court analyzed this difficulty
by first recognizing that the defendant's strict liability does not include "fault" in the
sense of blameworthiness or culpability. Next, the court correctly stated that the theory
of strict liability does not lend itself to a comparison of culpability. Finally, the court
stated that if the defendant were allowed to mitigate damages by showing the plaintiff's
negligence, this would force the plaintiff to show the defendant's culpability. This reintroduction of negligence, concluded the court, would be inappropriate and should not be
allowed. Howard, 520 So. 2d at 719.
34. The supreme court termed this "nonnegligent fault" in the Howard case. Id.
35. Howard v. Allstate Ins. Co., 510 So. 2d 685, 687 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987).
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offers no proof of the plaintiff's fault, the defendant cannot show the
plaintiff's causal contribution. In short, the introduction of comparative
causation still requires a consideration of the plaintiff's fault, and thus,
the conceptual conflict between negligence and strict liability remains.
One might argue that the concept of comparative causation does
resolve the conflict, at least in the abstract. The factfinder theoretically
could separate the considerations of the plaintiff's contribution to the
cause from the consideration of the culpability of the plaintiff's conduct.
From a practical standpoint though, no juror will be able to ignore the
blameworthiness of the plaintiff. The plaintiff's blameworthiness, then,
may cause his recovery to be reduced, rather than his causal conduct.
If so, then the Howard court's introduction of comparative causation
has solved nothing. The court in Howard does not reach or resolve this
very real problem. The court merely accepts the comparative causation
principle without delving into the analytical difficulties.
The second problem the court ignores is that of fairness and the
overcompensation of the plaintiff. The plaintiff's conduct, which the
defendant seeks to introduce, was culpable or blameworthy. This problem
arises because the court, in its analysis of negligent and nonnegligent
fault ignored a key question: Should the court ignore the plaintiff's
blameworthy conduct simply because evidence of the defendant's blameworthy conduct cannot be introduced? Policy reasons dictate that the
strictly liable defendant's culpability may not be known. To allow a
plaintiff, however, to be compensated where her culpable conduct is
known seems to run counter to principles of fairness. The plaintiff's
actions had an effect on the extent of her damages. To ignore the
plaintiff's conduct would allow the plaintiff to benefit from her mistake
and thus overcompensate her. The supreme court recognized in Bell and
its progeny that a plaintiff should not be allowed to benefit from his
own mistake. The court should therefore consider the blameworthy
conduct of the plaintiff in apportioning damages, regardless of whether
it can consider the defendant's culpability. This comparison, between
the plaintiff's culpability and the defendant's strict liability, took place
in Bell without having to introduce comparative causation. The court
in Bell reduced the plaintiff's recovery despite the fact that the defendant
was strictly liable. Thus, the court in Howard should have been able
to make the comparison without resorting to a new concept.
Approaches in other states
Comparative causation, as an apportionment concept, is not a new
idea. Over the past several years many states3 6 have applied the principle.

36.

The following states have adopted comparative causation as a means of distributing
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The term "comparative causation" does not, however, describe any
single, well-defined concept. There are four recognized approaches that
fall under the term. It is not at all clear that these approaches will
yield identical results. Since comparative causation may produce different
results, it is unknown whether the Louisiana Supreme Court, in adopting
comparative causation, intended to adopt one of the recognized approaches, none of these approaches, or some hybrid approach.
The first approach usually appears in states that have no comparative
negligence statute. In these states, the courts are free to create a fault
apportionment scheme without legislative restrictions. Courts in this
position may adopt a scheme that encompasses strict liability. California
is one such state. Observing that such a rule promotes "the equitable
allocation of loss among all parties legally responsible in proportion to
their fault,"13 7 the California Supreme Court judicially adopted comparative causation. The California Supreme Court, however, erroneously
uses the terms "fault" and "causation" interchangeably. The term "causation" is the more accurate in cases where the defendant's liability is
strict, since strict liability does not involve "fault" in the traditional
sense of culpability.38
A second approach39 called comparative causation includes strict
liability in tort within an existing apportionment statute using the term
"negligence." Courts achieve this result by characterizing strict liability
as negligence per se, "because it arises from a violation of a standard
of safety and requires no showing of foreseeability of harm." 40 Using
this interpretation, a court can include strict liability under comparative
negligence statutes.
One problem with using the negligence per se approach is the question of whether the resulting apportionment is actually comparative
causation or merely comparative fault with fault presumed. The difference is not merely semantical. If the resulting scheme is truly comparative
causation, the causal conduct of the parties will be compared without
regard to their fault. If, on the other hand, the resulting apportionment

accident costs among negligent plaintiffs, negligent defendants, and strictly liable defendants: Alaska, California, Florida, Montana, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Oregon, Mississippi, New Mexico, Texas, Minnesota, New Jersey, Idaho, Kansas, and New Hampshire;
the concept has also been recognized in federal admiralty jurisdiction and the U.S. Virgin
Islands. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 425-27 (Tex. 1984).
37. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 1172, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 387 (1978).
38. Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 427. "The trier of fact is to compare the harm caused
by the defective product [the thing or object involving strict liability] with the harm caused
by the negligence of the other defendants and . . . the plaintiff. The fault or conduct of
the (products) defendant is not an issue." Id.
39. This approach has been adopted in Wisconsin and Minnesota. See id. at 426.
40. Id. at 426.
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is merely comparative fault with a presumption of defendant fault, the
jury will not examine the conduct of the parties. Rather, the jury will
compare purely the amount of fault. If the defendant is presumed
blameworthy, arguably the jury will assume his fault initially is 100%0.
The fault of the plaintiff in the jury's collective mind will undoubtedly
seem less than the defendant's fault. The jury will be subtracting the
plaintiff's percentage of fault from the defendant's 100% fault. The
jury will be more likely to find a smaller percentage of fault attributable
to the plaintiff in this instance because of the assumption that the
defendant is solely liable. Although the jurors will recognize the blameworthy conduct of the plaintiff and reduce recovery by some amount,
the jurors will probably be hesitant to subtract a large amount. The
result will be that a greater percentage of liability will be apportioned
to the defendant than would have been apportioned had both parties
started with a presumption of no liability.
In a third approach to comparative causation, courts4' have found
negligent fault where there supposedly was none-in strict liability. These
courts held that the distribution of an unsafe product, for which manufacturers are strictly liable, was a departure from the required standard
of conduct for manufacturers. The courts labeled that departure "fault,"
meaning negligent fault, and then allowed the comparison of the plaintiff's negligent fault. The comparison made under this approach is
essentially a comparison of fault under a negligence standard.42
The fourth and final approach separates comparative negligence and
comparative causation. Rather than interpreting the statute to include
strict liability cases, the courts judicially adopt a separate comparative
43
system for strict liability cases.
The Texas Supreme Court, in adopting this fourth approach, reasoned that the "judicial adoption of a comparative apportionment system, independent of statutory comparative negligence, is a feasible and
desirable means of eliminating confusion and achieving efficient loss
allocation in strict liability cases."" The court made a clear distinction
between comparative causation and comparative fault stating that comparative causation is the accurate phrase only for strict liability cases,
when the defendant's "fault," in the traditional sense of culpability, is
45
not an issue.
There is a further point that must be noted when discussing comparative causation approaches in other states. Most cases in which the

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

This approach has been adopted in Idaho, Kansas, New Jersey, and Oregon. Id.
Id.
New Hampshire and Texas recognize this approach. Id.
Id.at 427.
Id.
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statutes have applied comparative causation were products liability cases,
the only form of "strict liability" in most states.4 6 Louisiana is unique
with its statutorily authorized strict liability for actions other than products liability. Other states do not have this "strict liability," although
they use the term "strict liability" to refer to actions that Louisiana
courts have dubbed "absolute liability."
In other states, the reduction of the plaintiff's recovery in connection
with a comparative causation scheme was predicated on the "unforeseeable misuse ' 47 of a product by the plaintiff. The "unforeseeable
misuse" of the product by the plaintiff was alleged as a defense by the
strictly liable defendant. "Unforeseeable misuse" of a product is the
misuse of a product in a way which the manufacturer could not have
reasonably foreseen. Foreseeable misuse of a product is within the duty
of a manufacturer in producing a safe product. "Unforeseeable misuse"
is not within that duty. The manufacturer thus is able to use "unforeseeable misuse" as a comparative defense to strict liability. The reduction in recovery based on "unforeseeable misuse" has been applied
in jurisdictions irrespective of the approach taken in the implementation
48
of comparative causation.
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Howard is not applying comparative
causation to a products liability case, but to a strict liability case for
animals, a type of statutorily imposed strict liability unknown in other
states. In light of the differences in the types of strict liability, it is
questionable whether comparative causation should be applied in this
case at all.
The Louisiana Approach
Justice Marcus, in one short sentence in Howard, adopted the concept of comparative causation in Louisiana, 49 but failed to articulate a

46. Louisiana is the only state that has strict liability imposed statutorily outside the
realm of strict products liability. The remaining forty-nine states have actions in negligence
or absolute liability, outside of products although most states do term their liability "strict
liability." Therefore, comparative causation has only been considered with respect to strict
liability in the context of strict products liability in other states.
47. "Unforeseeable misuse" of a product is the misuse of a product in a way that
the manufacturer could not have reasonably foreseen. Foreseeable misuse of a product,
that is, the misuse of a product which a manufacturer can reasonable foresee, is within
the duty of the manufacturer to produce a safe product. Unforeseeable misuse, on the
other hand, is not within the manufacturer's duty to the consumer.
48. Unforeseeable misuse has been used to reduce recovery in California, Daly v.
General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978); New
Hampshire, Thibaut v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978); New
Jersey, Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979);
and Wisconsin, Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). These four
states have implemented comparative causation using each of the four methods discussed
supra text accompanying notes 36-45.
49. Howard v. Allstate Ins. Co., 520 So. 2d 715, 719 (La. 1988).
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method of implementation. This results in speculation upon the approach
he would use. One of the four approaches used in other states may be
consistent with the logic Justice Marcus used in his opinion. The fourth
approach, which maintains separation between the concepts of strict
liability and negligence, seems to be the most likely candidate. This
approach is consistent with the finding by the court that strict liability
and negligence are irreconcilable. This argument is furthered by the fact
that the Louisiana comparative negligence statute does not specifically
include strict liability cases, although it does specifically include negligence actions.5 0
The court also struggles with the distinctions between negligent and
nonnegligent fault, hoping to maintain an analytical distinction. A judicially created comparative causation scheme could preserve these analytical differences by carefully formulating and wording opinions to
preserve them. However, if the court is using this method of implementation, it must articulate that fact.
The supreme court must also look at the actual comparative causation test that will be used. In Howard the court merely apportioned
5
Tina 10qo of the fault without stating the basis for this allocation. 1 It
is virtually impossible to ascertain what factors the supreme court considered in apportioning the damages. The supreme court must articulate
some method of apportionment. Judges, juries, and attorneys must be
able to determine how damages are apportioned in the courts of this
state.
Although Howard sheds little light, it can be said with certainty
that some items must be included in the jury instructions. A judge
should instruct the jury to determine if the conduct of both parties
bears a causal relationship to the harmful result. The jury should then
weigh the relative importance of each party's conduct, as if the other
party's conduct had not taken place. Finally, the jury should apportion
the liability. The judge could submit a form as follows:
Question 1: Did the defendant's acts contribute to the plaintiff's
injuries?
Question 2: Did the plaintiff's acts contribute to his/her own
injuries?
If, in answer to Questions 1 and 2, you have found that more
than one party's act(s) contributed to cause the plaintiff's injuries, and only in that event, then answer the following question.
Cause is defined as "that which in some manner is accountable

50. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
51. Howard, 520 So. 2d at 719. At least one leading commentator, Richard Epstein,
has developed a method for allocating the damages among the parties. See Arnold and
Rizzo, Causal Apportionment in the Law of Torts: An Economic Theory, 80 Colum. L.
Rev. 1399, 1406-08 (1980).
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for [a] condition that brings about" an injury.
Question 3: What percentage of plaintiff's injuries were caused
by the following persons:
Defendant
Plaintiff
TOTAL
100%7 2
This jury instruction sheet follows the goal of comparative causation

by instructing the jury to compare the acts of the defendant and plaintiff
that caused the plaintiff's injuries and supplying the jury with a definition
of cause.
CONCLUSION

The Louisiana Supreme Court, in deciding Howard, may have intended to revise the scheme of loss allocation in strict liability cases.
While the court should be commended for recognizing the need for loss
allocation in strict liability cases, it should also recognize that comparative causation principles do not alleviate the conceptual conflicts incountered by the court, and further, creates new problems. The court
should rethink its adoption of comparative causation in light of the
problems discussed. If the court chooses to continue applying comparative causation, the court must provide guidelines for its application
and a method for its implementation. The court now must elaborate
on the doctrine adopted so that it will serve the purposes for which it
was adopted.
Carla Ann Clark

52.

Compare the jury change implemented in the Duncan court, 655 S.W.2d at 427

